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Key messages 

 The term ‘fake news’ is ill-defined. Policymakers should be aware that the 
term has been used to serve the purposes of various political actors. 
 Some fake news problems do require action on the part of policymakers as 
well as media and tech companies, but the approach must be cautious, 
proportionate and protect free speech. 
 In a small number of cases, deliberately misleading ‘news’ that attempts to 
undermine elections could pose a threat to national security. Intermediaries 
such as Google and Facebook may be required to take such content down, 
but in most cases fact checking and monitoring will be sufficient. 
 Recent studies suggest that a majority of citizens (both students and 
adults) lack the capacity to correctly differentiate fake news from verified 
content. 
 Digital advertising revenue fuels fake news, and market mechanisms can 
be encouraged to respond to this problem. 
 Legitimate news sources, including critical voices, should be protected 
from interference by state bodies and also from threat, intimidation and 
exclusion from news gathering opportunities such as news conferences. 
 The appropriate policy response should be to encourage critical media 
literacy, self-regulation by platforms, and targeted enforcement in the very 
few cases that are threats to national security. New fines and changes in 
liability are not required, and legitimate media should be protected from 
accusations of ‘fake news’. 
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Introduction 


‘Let truth and falsehood grapple. Who ever knew Truth put to the worse in a 
free and open encounter?’ 
– Milton 


An apparent proliferation of inaccurate and misleading news stories has led to calls for new 
policy interventions, from fact checking by social media companies to new laws imposing fines 
for posting or sharing fake news. This raises some difficult issues in media policy. Is this a new 
problem? Is so called ‘fake news’ distinct from longstanding problems with accuracy or objectivity 
in journalism? Is the controversy rather a response to the scale of current political changes, and 
their impact on various interested parties? Are there fundamental changes going on in our 
Western media systems which undermine traditional journalistic crafts of fact checking and 
verification, and incentivise more emotionally resonant content, at the expense of quality, reliable 
journalism? 
The call for new policy responses to the issue of fake news engages obvious problems of 
freedom of expression: decisions about the truth or falsity of a statement have tended to be left to 
journalists and the media themselves, and oversight of such decisions could compromise their 
independence and speech rights. 
This paper sets out some of the groundwork for understanding and responding to the problem of 
‘fake news’. 
3 
 
Six types of fake news: Unpacking the concept 
 
The term ‘fake news’, on closer inspection, turns out to refer to a range of phenomena: from 
deliberately misleading attempts to undermine elections or national security at one end of the 
continuum to any view that challenges consensus ‘group think’ on the other.  
Each of these categories needs to be broken down further. They contain a variety of phenomena 
and require different responses: 
1. Alleged foreign interference in domestic elections through fake news 
It is claimed that Russian organisations have supported distribution of fake stories that 
support new populists such as Donald Trump and the Front National in France. The 
European Union has funded a disinformation review: https://euvsdisinfo.eu/ . The aim of 
this review is to monitor and fact-check what appear to be deliberate attempts to spread 
misinformation. There seem to be relatively few examples of deliberately fake stories 
propagated with the aim of affecting election results that are published in the language of 
the target country. 
2. Ad-driven invention 
Fake news “boiler houses” in Macedonia target resonance and share-ability ahead of any 
consideration for truth. Numerous investigations confirm that new ad models open new 
opportunities for people to make money through the peddling of fake news, and this may 
have been a factor in misinformation during the US presidential elections. Social media 
companies are in a difficult position: they do not wish to actively engage as editors in the 
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process of news selection and distribution, but neither do they want to be seen as 
choosing to do nothing about this problem. It is of course theoretically possible for news 
sites or stories to fit into both categories 1 and 2. 
3. Parody and satire 
One of the refreshing peculiarities of social media news is a new flourishing of political 
satire, and in particular, parody of news genres. Since Jonathan Swift’s A Modest 
Proposal, it has been abundantly clear that this form of fake news is a particularly 
important form of political speech, and it is important to note that regulatory solutions 
should protect, and perhaps even encourage it. A by-product of this genre has always 
been that a number of people will believe these parodies to be true. However as in the 
case of A Modest Proposal, when they are believed to be true, satire and parody are at 
their most powerful and are most worthy of protection. 
4. Bad journalism 
In the history of journalism there are numerous infamous cases of journalists simply 
making it up. In celebrity gossip in particular, journalists have an interest in conspiring 
with the publicity-hungry subjects of stories to feed public hunger for stories with scant 
regard for truth. Journalism sourcing ethics do not deal effectively with this. Since the UK 
Editors’ Code has been in existence, the most complained about article is consistently 
Article 1: Accuracy.  
i) The Press must take care not to publish inaccurate, misleading or distorted 
information or images, including headlines not supported by the text. 
Since neither industry body IPSO, nor its predecessor the PCC pro-actively policed this 
article of the code (they responded to complaints) and since neither body sought to 
adjudicate accuracy itself (they focused on journalistic processes of ‘taking care’), 
standards of accuracy in the press have not had a strong incentive to improve: readers 
were left to decide what was true and what was not and the assumption was that this 
would lead to at least some commercial pressure to verify. The result was that readers 
didn’t really know what to believe, and a great many people in all likelihood believe much 
that is fabricated. In some cases, where the subjects of stories are likely to complain, 
there are stronger incentives for more active verification to avoid potentially embarrassing 
complaints being upheld. 
5. News that is ideologically opposed 
Donald Trump in his infamous press conferences during the first month of his presidency 
devoted a good deal of time to “calling out” what he described as the fake news contained 
in the “mainstream media”. His ire was directed at the New York Times and CNN. But 
similar attempts to undermine and relativise authoritative voices, or indeed any voice that 
challenges one’s own perspective have used the phrase “fake news” as a form of insult.  
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6. News that challenges orthodox authority 
Any political community in any political epoch is characterised by a zeitgeist or shared 
orthodoxy, a set of rules or civic codes, or even ‘hegemony’. Attempts to present facts 
and events from the perspective that is not based on the shared set of assumptions would 
likely be dismissed as fake. This is seen most clearly in the area of business news. It is 
well established that business news is subject to ‘pro-cyclical’ group think which tends to 
exacerbate market corrections when they do come, as was the case during the financial 
crisis. In relation to all of these, it is important to reflect on the difference between 
statements of fact, the framing of those facts, and the decision-making process which 
determines the ‘news value’ of those facts and whether they deserve a wider audience. 
 
All of these categories of phenomena are subject to the general law including for example:  
 the law of defamation that would offer means to control fake news that is also defamatory, 
 intellectual property law that could support prosecution of fake news deliberately passing 
itself off under an established news brand,  
 electoral law, in some cases, could set aside the results of elections based on deliberate 
misinformation by a candidate. 
Each of these categories faces the same challenges at a fundamental level: it is important to 
balance the public interest in the free flow of news and the public interest in protecting news 
institutions as a form of independent verification. There may also be problems of enforcement, 
particularly across jurisdictions. There are also important questions of responsibility to resolve: if 
a false claim is made by campaigner, for example on a poster or on the side of a bus, is it the 
campaigner, or the news report that is responsible for propagating this claim? 
These difficulties explain why international defenders of free speech, such as the UN Special 
Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, 
have been outspoken regarding the dangers of regulating fake newsa. We are concerned about 
news because news matters. This is a debate about the commonly agreed facts upon which 
societal decisions – including elections – are made. The problem is that the previous gatekeeping 
structures that filtered news according to values of truth and objectivity – principally journalism – 
are being displaced. 

a See the Joint Declaration issued in March 2017 http://www.osce.org/fom/302796?download=true 
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News, truth and facts 
 
It is helpful to understand journalism as one among several approaches to agreeing on a version 
of truth. Philosophy and the social sciences have recently become polarised between “relativist” or 
“perspectivalist” approaches on one hand, that deny the possibility of single authoritative notions of 
truth regarding anything but the simplest facets of physical reality, and on the other hand 
“universalist” approaches that stress the possibility of agreeing the “truth” of statements with 
certainty. Some variants, particularly in continental philosophy, have stressed the political nature of 
the process of agreeing truth, stressing the role of power in establishing “regimes of truth”. 
In practice, what counts as truth depends on the context. In different realms of social life we have 
developed various rules and practices for establishing what should be treated as truth. 
Even in science, the possibility of positively establishing the truth of statements is in doubt. In his 
work on the philosophy of science, Karl Popper held that science progresses through seeking to 
falsify statements, but in the daily practice of science a variant of “verificationism” based on logical 
positivism underlies most applications of the scientific method. The basic premise of this approach is 
that only empirically verifiable statements are capable of being true. This is important, because it 
signals that there are different kinds of statements: part of ‘news’ consists in factual claims that are 
capable of empirical verification, whereas much of what is considered news, even if opinion is 
excluded, consists in statements that would be difficult to empirically verify, particularly statements 
that are “essentially contested” because they are politically consequential.  
An example for the challenges of verification in journalism would be the “45 minutes” claim 
published in the London Evening Standard on 24 September 2003. It is empirically verifiable that a 
government spokesman made the claim that Saddam Hussein had the capability to launch weapons 
of mass destruction capable of reaching the UK. So if the ‘news’ is that such a claim was made by 
the government, it is relatively easy to establish a procedure for verifying/ fact-checking this. But if a 
claim is reported as fact, i.e. it is a fact that Saddam Hussein’s government could launch weapons of 
mass destruction within 45 minutes, then that claim would be much more difficult to verify, as the UK 
intelligence services learned.  
In practice, the way news is presented makes it notoriously 
difficult to separate fact, opinion and value, and as the famous 
Evening Standard front page and the accompanying headlines 
make abundantly clear, there is a constant blurring between 
reporting the views of others and the authoritative voice of the 
news outlet itself. There is a grey area of value statements, or 
the reporting as fact of third party claims which are not 
conducive to verification. 
In law, different areas of legislation and case law establish 
different standards and approaches to truth. Our adversarial 
legal system involves a process of contestation and a series 
of standards and legal processes for establishing substantive 
legal truth and agreeing the “facts” of the case and the 
balance of probabilities relevant to the dispute. For example, 
the standard “beyond reasonable doubt” applies in most 
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criminal cases in Anglo-Saxon countries, but it is notoriously difficult to define and apply 
consistently. Memorably, when asked what it meant, the judge in the Vicky Pryce case which 
involved a driving offence by a politician, said “a reasonable doubt is a doubt that is reasonable”. 
In practice, standards and rules of thumb are used, such as the idea that ‘in the mind of any 
reasonable person there should be no doubt that could be described as reasonable’. There 
remains a dispute within the law about whether judicial findings of fact need to be distinguished 
from substantive truth because of practical difficulties, for example the absence of evidence. 
Legal conditions of perfect evidence, like economic conditions of perfect information, rarely apply, 
and court proceedings could be characterised as agreeing a version of the truth acceptable to the 
parties rather than the truth in any scientific sense.b 
In journalism these epistemological questions are bypassed by professional practices of 
verification, and norms in particular of sourcing and fact checking. The practices of source 
verification in journalism differ from country to country and from title to title. The “gold standard” 
of two named sources applies only in the most important stories, and in the elite titles that have 
the resources to source and check stories to a very high standard. However, in the daily practice 
of journalism, particularly tabloid newspaper journalism, standards of verification have been 
applied in a patchy way.  
Broadcasters, which have been regulated by Ofcom and the BBC Trust, have more exacting 
standards. Particularly since broadcasting became the principal source of news in the mid-20th 
century, various forms of verification have applied, due to journalistic commitments to truth, 
sourcing and fact checking. Broadcasters are required to meet higher journalistic standards, 
including tougher sanctions for inaccuracy, but they face no pre-publication censorship. Article 5 
of the Ofcom Broadcasting Code for example demands that: “News, in whatever form, must be 
reported with due accuracy and presented with due impartiality”; and that “Significant mistakes in 
news should normally be acknowledged and corrected on air quickly.” 
In this sense, media systems, whilst not bias free, did act as a filter that encouraged distribution 
of statements that had passed various professional tests of truth. Media systems also 
incorporated clear “fact-value” distinctions, as captured in the famous dictum attributed to CP 
Scott of the Guardian: “comment is free, but facts are sacred.” Opinion was discouraged in the 
powerful medium of broadcasting, and segregated from news reporting in print. Some aspects of 
news can and does aspire to high standards of factual claims making that are conducive to 
falsification and fact checking whilst others essentially comprise value statements. Contrast 
“Trump is not a US citizen” and “Boris Johnson had an extramarital affair” with “Trump is 
effective” and “Boris Johnson is an idiot”. The latter statements, as value statements or opinions 
are not capable of falsification, even though many will argue against the sentiment. 
It is of course the case that a great deal of news consists in factual claims such as the notorious 
claim in the Sun newspaper that the TV comedian “Freddie Starr ate my Hamster”. The hamster 
herself might not be available to testify, but we may well be able to assemble witnesses to take 
part in a process that supports establishing ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ whether or not he did. The 
problem is that, as was revealed during the Leveson Inquiry, it is often in nobody’s interest to do 
this. Particularly where facts and values are essentially contested, and politically consequential, 
the resources required to do so would be huge. The current environment, where what is classed 
as ‘news’ is growing and a much looser term than it once was this is becoming more difficult. It is 
difficult to hold to such a high standard of truth in the Daily Mill of 24-hour news, and would be 

b http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2388&context=facpub 
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impossible if we include citizen journalism and social media posts.  
In summary: journalism and the law involve pragmatic practices for establishing the truth and 
falsity of statements appropriate to context. In legal cases, adversarial contestation establishes 
not substantive truth, but a version of events that the participants in a legal case can agree upon. 
In journalism, professional journalistic standards of sourcing determine what can be published. 
Much of what is considered news includes value statements that are in any case not capable of 
verification or falsification. Until now, these approaches have continued in relative stability. But 
profound changes, both in the media and in politics, have undermined existing institutions. 
In some (but by no means all) online journalism, the approach has been to ‘publish now, correct 
later,’ the idea being that the ‘wisdom of crowds’ or crowdsourced fact checking can easily 
correct errors in this medium. The argument against this approach, of course, is that an error 
may have gone half way around the world before it is retracted, and errors can prove difficult to 
correct once they have taken hold. As the BBC found in a study of online rumours: ‘the number of 
followers of people who tweeted the rumour was much larger than the number of followers of 
those who corrected it”. c 

c http://www.bbc.com/future/story/20170301-lies-propaganda-and-fake-news-a-grand-challenge-of-our-age 
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Fake news. Why now? Who benefits? 
 
Why have politicians and the media suddenly started talking about fake news? It is worth asking 
who benefits from using this concept. I would say there are three main beneficiaries: 
 The new populists benefit because they use the notion of “fake news” to undermine 
legitimate opposition, and resist fourth estate accountability. The Trump administration in 
the US uses the term fake news in a blanket way to describe news content it disagrees 
with. This approach becomes particularly serious and alarming when it is used to justify 
new forms of media regulation, including restricting access of certain media to news 
events and information. 
 Historical losers. Those on the wrong side of recent historical events claim that political 
changes result from misinformation. Both the EU referendum vote in the UK and the 
Trump victory in the US have been blamed on ‘fake news’. Some even go so far as to 
suggest that a result based on misinformation is not legitimate. 
 Legacy media. At the very least, the established “mainstream media” want to discredit the 
‘wisdom of crowds’ and aim for a return to trusted news brands. The media benefit from 
the “fake news crisis” in their long-term battle with the new tech intermediaries. By 
claiming that the intermediaries (mainly Facebook and Google) are in fact acting as 
media, and doing so irresponsibly, with none of the obligations that traditional media have 
taken on, they can seek to get them regulated as such, and recoup lost ad revenue.  
All three of these constituencies have a claim to a grain of truth about fake news, and have 
forced it onto the agenda. It should also be acknowledged that the historical circumstances of 
2016-2017 have been rather particular: a US election and an EU referendum involving very 
polarized choices in the context of a collapse of deference. So many promoting the concept of 
fake news have an axe to grind, but at the same time it cannot be denied that structural changes 
in media systems are transforming the procedures for verifying and distributing news. 
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Advertising and fake news 
 
The graphic below summarises the money-go-round that incentivises distribution of any content 
that is “shareable” and resonant, in contrast to the previous ad model that tended to support 
news that goes through an (expensive) process of verification or meets a quality standard. 
Here’s how it works: 
1. Programmatic advertising is sold automatically on the basis not of which outlet or news 
brand it will appear in, but on the basis of how many ‘clicks’ or views it will receive from a 
target demographic, is bought by an advertiser. This is important: the advertiser now pays 
for clicks and views, not news. 
2. The ad agency, usually through an intermediary, an ad network or a platform such as 
Google or Facebook, operates a real-time auction that is entirely automated. It serves ads 
to end users, charging advertisers and transferring payments for each view from 
advertisers to publishers while taking a commission. In case where the intermediary also 
owns the media space, such as Google or Facebook, they get to keep the whole fee. 
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3. The publisher, which could be either a legitimate news company, or a bogus fake news 
boiler house operating out of Macedonia or Moscow, also contract their inventory with the 
ad network, and with intermediaries such as Facebook and YouTube, thereby receiving 
revenue from a number of platforms proportionately to the number of views and shares 
they receive. It is in the interests of the publisher, the intermediary, and sometimes - but 
not always - the advertiser, to maximise the views of any article. More views equal more 
clicks, more clicks equal more revenue for publisher and intermediary and more web 
traffic or brand exposure for the advertisers. In some cases, it is not in the advertiser’s 
interest to appear next to questionable content. 
4. In a hypothetical example, a publisher who uses Facebook instant articles to distribute 
their content could choose to put ads next to the content. A video ad, for example,e is 
reported to have a 55:45 revenue splitd in favour of the publisher. If the article was to 
achieve a reach of 500,000 users with a cost per thousand impressione of $7.19 (the 
average cost every time the ad was seen by 1,000 people), this would mean $1,977 for 
the publisher and $1,617 for Facebook. 
 
Who wins? 
Arguably, publishers who perfect the art of distraction are the biggest winners in this system. 
It could of course be argued that it was always the case that cheap, vivid-if-dubious content paid, 
which is why newspapers published ‘fake news’ that would attract idle consumers standing at 
supermarket checkouts. But the new system bypasses the checks and ethical balances that had 
evolved in most Western press systems: freedom of the press was always subject to balancing 
rights, and self-regulation and professional ethics which encouraged accuracy and responsible 
journalism. 
The platforms also benefit. They are dependent on consumers spending more time with sticky 
content, and have a lot to gain from the current power shift away from traditional news 
publishers. Ad agencies, ad networks, and  internet service providers all benefit. 
There is a reason that the impacts are being felt globally and have even been linked to ‘post 
truth’ politicsf more generally: This shift in advertising models is not something that is happening 
at the margins: it is a massive structural change that is transforming media systems everywhere. 
We are no longer talking about garish front pages of the National Enquirer or the Sun. The Sun 
does at least operate within some semblance of ethical self-restraint, however flawed the PCC 
and IPSO may be. The new publishers can be anywhere in the world, perhaps including 
countries that have a foreign policy interest in using fake news to undermine national security or 
delegitimise democracy. 
Like the notorious “50 cent” bloggers in Chinag, these proliferate fastest when a multi-sided 

d http://www.recode.net/2017/1/9/14211466/facebook-video-advertising-midroll 
e https://adespresso.com/academy/blog/facebook-ads-cost/ 
f http://www.lse.ac.uk/website-
archive/newsAndMedia/videoAndAudio/channels/publicLecturesAndEvents/player.aspx?id=3704 
g https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/05/19/the-chinese-government-fakes-
nearly-450-million-social-media-comments-a-year-this-is-why/?utm_term=.4cffcf403e21 
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market can be established. If publishers are not only able to access revenues from advertisers 
and platforms, but also from government clients of one kind or another. From a democratic point 
of view, the sad thing about the new ecology is that it feeds on the civic trust that it destroys: 
duping consumers into sharing content, by harnessing their civic emotions and polarising political 
ideologies. The most shareable news is that which confirms our prejudices and those of our 
networks. 
In sum, what this new advertising ecosystem does is establish a much more direct economic link 
between the resonance and share-ability of individual articles and economic reward. It also 
enables smaller publishers to thrive outside the ethical and self-regulatory constraints which in 
the past tightly reinforced an ethics of truth-seeking. 
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Policy responses to fake news 
 
 
The policy response to fake news: China as a comparative case 
The example of China’s crackdown on “online rumours” since 2013 is a useful illustration of the dangers of 
(i) establishing structures of prepublication regulation and (ii) having too wide definition of what constitutes 
unverified fake news or “rumour”. 
During 2013-2014 it was reported that the Chinese authorities had intensified their policy of deleting posts 
on Chinese social media such as Wechat. Chinese authorities claimed that these were “necessary to 
safeguard citizens' rights and interests, and promote the healthy development of the internet”. The Chinese 
approach is to make operators of social networks responsible for removing a widely defined category of 
content considered to be ‘rumours’ and jail terms of up to 3 years for those responsible. Service providers 
are required to suspend the accounts of those found to be responsible for spreading “irresponsible 
rumours”. A number of categories of such rumours are identified: these include undermining morality, the 
socialist system, and the authenticity of information. Discretion for deciding what fits into these categories 
lies with the social networks, but these are periodically reviewed under the terms of their licences. In China, 
social networks must be in receipt of several different licences from central government.h Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that incentivising intermediary filtering and blocking through the threat of strong 
penalties leads to intermediaries developing automated blocking and filtering, together with expensive 
human-led programs of deletion. Due to the lack of transparency it is impossible to know precisely what is 
blocked, but the evidence reported by Western journalists suggests that over blocking is rife. 
 
 
 
The new Italian draft law on fake news  
In February 2017 a draft law was introduced to the Italian Parliament in response to the issue of ‘Fake 
News’. This attempted to criminalise the posting or sharing of ‘false, exaggerated or tendentious news’, 
imposing fines of up to 5000 Euros on those responsible. In addition, the law proposed imprisonment for 
the most serious forms of fake news such as those that might incite crime or violence, and also imposed an 
obligation on social media platforms to monitor their services for such news. The law was expected to meet 
with significant resistance in Parliament in part because of the difficulties in agreeing definitions of some of 
the key terms such as ‘false, exaggerated or tendentious’ news, which could include a wide variety of 
forms of news, including satire and public interest journalism, and because it appeared to challenge 
accepted standards of freedom of expression under Art. 10 ECHR. One of the key proposals of the law 
was to promote media literacy. 
 

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2015-10-06/chinas-rumor-mill  
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/10/china-social-media-jail-rumours 
http://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/1313153/why-china-needs-new-internet-laws-fight-
online-rumour 
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What is to be done? 
The UK will not follow the example of China. The Chinese approach, like the proposed Italian 
law, does not meet established standards of free speech. But neither should the UK fall into the 
trap of relativist perspectivism and do nothing.  
Given the incoherence of the category of “fake news” and the wide variation of interests 
underlying calls for its regulation, it is necessary to offer different solutions for the different 
categories along the fake speech continuum. Different recommendations apply to the different 
categories: deliberate falsehood with a national security implications; fake news for financial gain; 
and other categories such as satire and critical journalism. 
The only category where there may be an argument for statutory regulation is the category of 
deliberate falsehood with intent to compromise national security. Under the European 
Convention on Human Rights there is a legitimate justification for restricting free speech on 
national security grounds. From a regulatory point of view the difficulty is in establishing the 
appropriate standard (for example distinguishing genuine threats that have consequences to 
security from communication that is merely embarrassing)i. The main way governments have 
responded thus far is through monitoring, but the next stage would be requiring takedown of such 
messages. 
The category of falsehood for financial gain requires a different response that goes with the 
grain of financial incentives in the emerging industry of online advertising. The problem with this 
category is that we do not yet know what the consequences are of the deep structural shift in the 
political economy of media systems in the West. We do not yet know whether the impact on 
funding of journalism and the intensification of economic incentives to promote truth-blind share-
ability will be subject to a systemic reaction through the market (people will pay for more trusted 
news; and advertisers will bring pressure to bear) or whether a legal and policy intervention might 
be required in the long-term. 
As Damian Collins MP pointed out into his speech to the Oxford Media Convention in 2017, there 
is already some evidence of a systemic correction. Advertisers want more control over the 
content that their messages are associated with. They want to put more pressure on those that 
sell advertising to ensure that they are not inadvertently funding or rewarding fake news. So there 
is some evidence that the system is building in checks and balances. However we are at a very 
early stage in this process: it is worth noting that the proposal that advertisers should be able to 
have an impact on content is of course the opposite of traditional media ethics which demanded 
separation of advertiser control from editorial content. What is being proposed here is an 
introduction of a new form of editorial control which if successful will require further oversight and 
transparency and ethical reflection.  
There are a number of areas where recommendations could be made for nudges and incentives 
to encourage the market-driven response. There is a role for government and Parliament as 
conveners, and triggers for action in this field, but for obvious reasons of freedom of expression, 
both government and parliament should be cautious in their approach, and very cautious of any 
actions that could chill free speech or undermine the autonomy of media institutions. 
As the diagram on the next page shows there are at least five types of actions that could be 
encouraged: 

i This has been discussed for example with reference to WikiLeaks publication of sensitive US intelligence. 
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 The natural tendency for advertisers to require better guarantees of what their products 
will be associated with could be encoded in more transparent codes of conduct for the 
interactive and advertising industry; this could be triggered and encouraged by 
Parliamentary recommendations.  
 Existing and new projects in fact checking and verification could be facilitated, for 
example through funding, if principles of independence of funding are implemented. 
 Industry could be encouraged to develop trust marks or warning flags that show both 
where independent verification indicates sources should be trusted, and also where 
questions have been raised with regard to individual stories and sources of news. 
 Government can encourage the teaching of critical media literacy to encourage a 
culture shift in the credulity of citizens. 
 All of the above actions can be conducted within the scope of moral exhortation rather 
than the direct threat of sanctions. However it can be made clear that the obvious next 
stage, should the new digital media industries fail to deal with the threat of fake news, is 
that the liability regime for intermediaries such as social media should be reviewed. 
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Parody and Critical Voices 
The remaining categories of what has been described as fake news require a radically different 
approach, because they represent content that far from being damaging, is oriented towards the 
public interest, provides a valuable form of accountability, and is a natural check on group think. 
Critical perspectives in journalism and news face huge threats, not least a concerted campaign to 
describe them as ‘fake news’. This category of content would benefit from a strong reaffirmation 
of established principles of freedom of the media, as well as a renewed commitment to public 
support for such enterprises for example through tax breaks, distribution privileges and where 
appropriate subsidies. 
 
Closing remarks 
 
The problem of fake news is not in fact a single problem. It is several symptoms of the ongoing 
transformation of news and journalism and wider political and social changes. These require 
action, but not actions that are controlled by governments, because governments may succumb 
to the temptation to create media systems that suit their political interests. An additional 
recommendation underpins all the others therefore: the setting up of a permanent, civil society 
led forum for discussion of these problems, and ensure that they are entirely protected from any 
risk of government interference or capture by other interests. 
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